Иммануил Кант — самый русский из европейских и самый европейский из русских философов. Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге — сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет. Эммануэль, но не Кант! Шольц для Путина является более весомой фигурой, который представляет интересы бизнеса Германии. Путин видит давление, которому подвергается. See an archive of all immanuel kant stories published on the New York Media network, which includes NYMag, The Cut, Vulture, and Grub Street. Emmanuel Kant. Emmanuel Kant. Follow new publications.
Doing Nothing with Emmanuel Kant
The Life, Work and Legacy of Carl Jung. Category: Emmanuel Kant. 18+. Вы здесь. Главная» Эммануэль Макрон. An unrelated news platform with which you have had no contact builds a profile based on that viewing behaviour, marking space exploration as a topic of possible interest for other videos. Et l'activité mentale, Filosofia, Kant (Emmanuel). Etudes. Впервые президент Франции Эммануэль Макрон принял участие в заседании комитета по поиску решений для легальной досрочной смерти. "Я глубоко убежден – и это отвечает. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is the central figure in modern philosophy. He synthesized early modern rationalism and empiricism, set the terms for much of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy.
Последние дни Иммануила Канта (1994) Les derniers jours d Emmanuel Kant
Ректор БФУ им. Иммануила Канта Александр Федоров отметил: философия не эксклюзивное занятие, ею, осмысляя действительность и место в ней, занимается каждый. Emmanuel Kant слушать лучшее онлайн бесплатно в хорошем качестве на Яндекс Музыке. Что любопытно, Эммануэль Макрон говорит об этом сейчас, когда реальна перспектива возвращения к власти в США Дональда Трампа. 18+. Вы здесь. Главная» Эммануэль Макрон. Источник: РИА "Новости". Впервые президент Франции Эммануэль Макрон принял участие в заседании комитета по поиску решений для легальной досрочной смерти. "Я глубоко убежден – и это отвечает.
Голосование "Великие имена": в самолётах Канта уже называют "Эммануилом"
Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге — сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет даже был российским подданным. Тем не менее в нашей стране созданная им теория не столь популярна. В чем причины русского «антикантианства»?
How is autonomous action possible?
How is a perception of beauty possible? How are living creatures possible?
Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us.
We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different.
Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition. Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did.
Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves. Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations.
This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable.
The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class.
But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us?
Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves.
So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves.
A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants.
There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories.
For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one.
Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular.
Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way. In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself.
Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience.
The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world. Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way.
Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia.
That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together.
Moreover, recall from 4. It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind. The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective. These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world. Kant identifies the categories in what he calls the metaphysical deduction, which precedes the transcendental deduction.
But since categories are not mere logical functions but instead are rules for making judgments about objects or an objective world, Kant arrives at his table of categories by considering how each logical function would structure judgments about objects within our spatio-temporal forms of intuition. For example, he claims that categorical judgments express a logical relation between subject and predicate that corresponds to the ontological relation between substance and accident; and the logical form of a hypothetical judgment expresses a relation that corresponds to cause and effect. Taken together with this argument, then, the transcendental deduction argues that we become self-conscious by representing an objective world of substances that interact according to causal laws.
Дынкиным в ходе проведения российско-белорусского форума «Рубежи Союзного государства» , организованного в октябре 2022 г. В 2022-2023 г. Проект направлен на развитие научно-экспертного и общественного диалога между странами большого Балтийско-Скандинавского региона: странами ЕС — с одной стороны и Россией и Белоруссией — с другой, с привлечением экспертов из других стран и регионов мира. Главная цель — возобновление научно-экспертного диалога по «второму треку» по широкому перечню тематик между российскими и европейскими учеными: от социальных, экономических, экологических, культурных до проблем военной и невоенной безопасности.
«Мы в центре мощнейшей когнитивной войны»: Алиханов объяснил, почему нужна ревизия учения Канта
suggesting in 2013 that he should be made an official symbol of the Kaliningrad Region. Полузащитник «Челси» Н'Голо Канте завершил медицинское обследование перед подписанием контракта с клубом «Аль-Иттихад» из Саудовской Аравии. Канте прошёл вторую часть. Полузащитник «Челси» Н’Голо Канте дал согласие на переход в миланский «Интер». Адмиралы Балтийского флота уверены, что Канта звали Эммануэль. Эммануэль Кант.#кант #балтфлот Browse Getty Images' premium collection of high-quality, authentic Emmanuel Kant stock photos, royalty-free images, and pictures. Settings and more. Buffering. Emmanuelle Kant (Original Mix) (our 2nd recordeal!) BESTINSPACE ™.
«Эммануил Кант скачать все альбомы»: в социальных сетях шутят о философе
А еще на обедах его доме говорили о чем угодно, но не о философии. Во второй половине дня Кант в одиночестве совершал продолжительную прогулку, строго следуя по одному и тому же маршруту. Некая эксцентричность привычек не мешала философу вести светский образ жизни — у него было много знакомств и приятелей, а сам он был галантен с дамами. Читал лекции по теоретической физике и тригонометрии Когда в марте 1746 года умер отец Иммануила Канта Георг, тому пришлось на время взять на себя домашние хлопоты, в том числе заботу о двух младших сестрах 17 и 14 лет и 9-летнем брате. В 1748-м Кант покинул Кенигсберг, стал давать частные уроки и на время забыл об университетской жизни. Вернулся обратно он только спустя шесть лет, в 1754 году, и с тех пор его жизнь была связана с университетом и преподаванием.
В апреле 1755-го Иммануил Кант получил степень магистра, а в июне, защитив латинскую диссертацию «Новое освещение первых принципов метафизического познания», — докторскую степень и звание приват-доцента философии. Но была одна тонкость: он не получал от университета деньги, только гонорары от студентов за посещение лекций. Поэтому Кант начал активно и много преподавать. Так, у него появился курс лекций по физической географии, общему естествознанию, этике, механике, физике и тригонометрии. Его занятия были популярными благодаря подаче материала и остроумию.
Кант умел довести своих студентов до смеха шутками, сохраняя при этом невозмутимый вид. Постоянное место профессора логики и метафизики Иммануил Кант получил только в 46 лет, а еще он дважды занимал пост ректора Кенигсбергского университета. Свои последние лекции он прочитал летом 1796 года, за несколько лет до своей кончины.
Гости: Александр Федоров, ректор Балтийского федерального университета имени Иммануила Канта, и Алексей Козырев, исполняющий обязанности декана философского факультета Московского государственного университета имени М. Лаб: все выпуски.
Способен ли он надеяться? В третьем ответе кантовского чат-бота надежду чат-бот высказал относительно того, что будет развиваться, но уровня человеческого мышления не достигнет, но, на мой взгляд, это сомнительно. Мне кажется, что это вполне реально, и я, с одной стороны, боюсь, с другой — надеюсь застать это на своём веку.
Ну и, конечно, последний вопрос: чем вообще является искусственный интеллект? Если по Канту, человек — это моральное существо, можем ли таким моральным существом считать искусственный интеллект?
Канта при участии Института Европы РАН — провели специальную научно-экспертную сессию «Наследие Иммануила Канта для современных международных отношений». В ходе мероприятия участники рассмотрели широкий спектр проблем теории и практики современных международных отношений и безопасности через призму политической и международно-правовой мысли выдающегося философа. В центре внимания не только наиболее острые проблемы развития современного политического миропорядка, глобальной и региональной безопасности, но и обстановка в Балтийско-Арктическом регионе, а также вопросы мирового социально-экономического и политического развития.
В специальной сессии приняли участие ведущие специалисты в области международной политики из России, Финляндии, Германии, Индии и Республики Беларусь.
Climate change and the environment take a back seat in Emmanuel Macron's speech on Europe
| Emmanuel Kant, no place to chance! | Bowman on Kant anti-Semitism. |
| Ведущие ученые мира выступили с докладами на Международном Кантовском конгрессе - Российская газета | Когда принималось решение широко отметить 300-летие немецкого философа Иммануила Канта, необходимость интеграции отечественной гуманитарной науки с мировой еще не. |
| Daily Mail: Канте хочет перейти в «Интер» | Иммануил Кант — самый русский из европейских и самый европейский из русских философов. Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге — сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет. |
| Emmanuel Kant, no place to chance! | Иммануил Кант родился 22 апреля 1724 года в Кенигсберге, Пруссия, в небогатой семье ремесленника. |
| ‘Nothing would survive’ Scientists warn dark energy could ‘END universe at any moment’ - Daily Star | Лоран Канте родился в 1961 году в семье школьных учителей, киноискусство он изучал сначала в Марселе, а потом — в парижской Высшей школе кинематографистов. |
Канте прошёл вторую часть медобследования перед переходом в «Аль-Иттихад»
Он любил красивых женщин и не переставал ими восхищаться. В преклонном возрасте он перестал видеть левым глазом, поэтому всегда усаживал одну из юных красавиц с правой стороны. Философ никому никогда не признавался в своих чувствах. Одна из женщин из его окружения — Луиза Ребекка Фриц, впоследствии вспоминала, что вызывала симпатию ученого. По мнению Боровского Кант влюблялся два раза, и даже собирался жениться на своих возлюбленных. Иммануил отличался редким педантизмом, он придерживался распорядка вплоть до минуты, ни разу в жизни не опоздал. Ежедневно, в одно и то же время он приходил в кафе и выпивал там чашку чая.
Официанты этого заведения могли сверять по нему часы. С таким же педантизмом он отправлялся везде, даже на обычные прогулки. С детских лет Кант не отличался богатырским здоровьем, он разработал для себя специальную гигиену, которая и помогла ему достичь преклонного возраста. Его день начинался в пять часов утра. Прямо в ночной одежде Иммануил шел в свой кабинет, где слуга уже ждал его с чашкой слабо заваренного зеленого чая и курительной трубкой. Слуга постоянно удивлялся странной особенности своего хозяина — Кант каждый раз надевал на голову треуголку, не снимая ночного колпака.
Он наслаждался чаем, курением табака, принимался за изучение плана будущей лекции. Так проходило два часа. Портрет Иммануила Канта В семь часов ученый переодевался в привычную одежду, спускался в зал для лекций, который к тому времени был битком набит слушателями. Он медленно читал лекции по философии, периодически вставляя в них шутки. Кант очень щепетильно относился к внешнему виду собеседников. Он даже не смотрел в сторону неряшливо одетых студентов.
Однажды он увидел, что у студента нет пуговицы на рубахе, и от этого буквально впал в ступор, забыв, о чем рассказывал до этого. Лекция длилась два часа, затем ученый снова возвращался к себе, облачался в ночную пижаму, надевал бессменную треуголку. Он работал ровно 3 часа и 45 минут. Затем была подготовка к обеду, во время которого ученый принимал гостей. Кухарка накрывала шикарный стол, Кант ненавидел обедать в одиночку, тем более, что это был единственный прием пищи за сутки. Стол представлял собой полное изобилие, единственное, что там отсутствовало пиво.
Иммануил прохладно относился к этому солодовому напитку, считая его употребление дурным вкусом. Ученый предпочитал хорошее вино. Кант всегда ел одной ложкой, которая лежала вместе с денежными купюрами. Во время обеда было принято обсуждать все, что угодно, кроме философии. Смерть Иммануил Кант имел свой дом и неплохой достаток.
Сообщается, что финансовые условия будут аналогичными тем, которые есть у Канте в «Челси» на данный момент. Материалы по теме.
Что точно не нуждается в доработке уже сейчас — это фразы, которые использует цифровой Иммануил Кант во время беседы. Ольга Юрицына, заведующая секцией «Музей Иммануила Канта» в Кафедральном соборе Калининграда: «Отбирая цитаты, мы могли отобрать намного больше, чем 250. Остановились на этих, потому что нам кажется, что они больше отражают наш сегодняшний мир и те вопросы, те чаяния, которые беспокоят современных людей». Григорий Хуциев, и. Кстати, приветствует и прощается цифровой Иммануил Кант так же, как делал это реальный прототип. Например, фразой «Будьте счастливы в своем стремлении к истине» философ закончил одно из писем своему другу.
Гости: Александр Федоров, ректор Балтийского федерального университета имени Иммануила Канта, и Алексей Козырев, исполняющий обязанности декана философского факультета Московского государственного университета имени М. Показать больше.
Иммануил Кант: философ, присягнувший на верность Российской империи
| Immanuel Kant - Wikipedia | Иммануил Кант – немецкий философ, основал немецкую классическую философию, жил в эпоху Просвещения и романтизма. |
| Emmanuel Kant pictures and photos | Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников. |
| Climate change and the environment take a back seat in Emmanuel Macron's speech on Europe | Name: Emmanuel Kant Duarte. Type: User. Bio: Learning a little piece of code every day and drinking coffee. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. |
| Emmanuel Kant : Actualités et dernières infos | Name: Emmanuel Kant Duarte. Type: User. Bio: Learning a little piece of code every day and drinking coffee. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. |
| Emmanuel Kant Duarte | Name: Emmanuel Kant Duarte. Type: User. Bio: Learning a little piece of code every day and drinking coffee. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. |
Искусственный интеллект «оживил» Иммануила Канта в Калининграде
В чем причины русского «антикантианства»? Почему история философии делится на «до» и «после» Канта? И как учения философа помогут современному человеку бороться с фейками и информационными атаками?
Давайте и мы поговорим об этом человеке.
Возможно, вы скажете, что это полная ерунда. Кому вообще есть до этого дело? Но в самих этих фразах — проявление моральной философии.
Произнося их, вы подвергаете сомнению ценность какого-то явления. Стоит ли оно вашего времени и внимания? Оно лучше или хуже других?
Такие вопросы относятся к сфере морали. В чём заключается моральная философия Канта Моральная философия определяет наши ценности — что для нас важно, а что неважно. Ценности определяют наши решения, поступки и убеждения.
Поэтому моральная философия затрагивает абсолютно всё в нашей жизни. Моральная философия Канта уникальна и на первый взгляд противоречит интуиции. Он был уверен: что-то может считаться хорошим, только если оно универсально.
Нельзя назвать поступок правильным в одной ситуации и неправильным в другой. Если лгать — плохо, значит, это всегда плохо, кто бы и когда бы это ни делал. Кант назвал такие универсальные этические принципы категорическими императивами.
Это правила, по которым нужно жить. Они действуют в любых ситуациях для любого человека. Некоторые из них были разгромлены другими философами в пух и прах, другие выдержали испытание временем.
Один из императивов поразил меня больше всего. В любой ситуации он чётко указывает, как нужно действовать и почему. Поступай так, чтобы ты всегда относился к человечеству и в своём лице, и в лице всякого другого так же, как к цели, и никогда не относился бы к нему только как к средству.
Ничего не понятно! Но давайте притормозим на минутку. Кант считал, что рациональность священна.
Под рациональностью здесь подразумевается не умение играть в шахматы или разгадывать судоку, а сознание. Насколько сейчас известно, мы единственный во Вселенной пример разумной самоорганизации. Единственные существа, которые способны принимать решения , взвешивать варианты и оценивать моральные последствия своих действий.
Значит, нам нужно относиться к этому серьёзно. Значит, рациональность и охрана сознательного выбора должны быть основой моральных суждений. Что именно для этого делать?
Смотрите правило выше. Как это касается нашей жизни Давайте сформулируем правило более понятным языком. К человеку никогда нельзя относиться только как к средству для достижения какой-то цели.
Относитесь к нему как к самостоятельной цели. Чтобы стало ещё понятнее, разберём на примерах. Допустим, я хочу съесть буррито.
Я сажусь в машину и еду в любимый ресторанчик мексиканской кухни. В этой ситуации съесть буррито — это моя конечная цель. Именно поэтому я сажусь в машину, заезжаю по пути на заправку и так далее.
Всё это средства для достижения цели. Конечная цель — то, что мы хотим, само по себе. Это главный мотивирующий фактор наших решений и поступков.
Если я еду за буррито, потому что моя жена его захотела, а я хочу её порадовать, то буррито больше не конечная цель. Конечная цель — сделать приятное жене. Но если я хочу сделать ей приятное, чтобы вечером у меня было больше шансов на секс, радость жены — это тоже не цель, а средство для получения секса.
Скорее всего, после последнего примера вы подумали, что я какой-то мерзкий тип. Это именно то, о чём говорил Кант. Отношение к человеку как к средству для достижения своей цели — это основа аморального поведения.
Проверим, применимо ли это правило к другим поступкам: Лгать неэтично, потому что вы дезориентируете человека для достижения собственных целей.
Кант - такая величина, что рядом с ним можно поставить любое другое слово, любую тему и написать на эту тему трактат. Кант отражается в каждой капле мироздания, и, надеюсь, к концу разговора будет ясно, что музыка - не крошечная часть его вселенной.
Кафедральный собор принимал Международный Кантовский конгресс, в котором в этом году участвовали 500 ученых из 23 стран. В 15 часов сотую, юбилейную, лекцию прочел профессор БФУ Леонард Александрович Калинников, посвятивший Канту более 180 статей и 8 монографий. Традиционное возложение цветов — символа памяти и любви - к могиле мыслителя состоялось в 17.
Несколько лет назад она была написана специально для этого места и с тех пор больше нигде не исполнялась. Главным компонентом спектакля о Канте, где Дмитрий Минченок проживает жизнь человека, которого все признают великим, остается импровизация.
Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located. We cannot know theoretically that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves. In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals.
Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter.
We can cognize only the former a priori, i. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition. Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps.
It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did. Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves. Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations.
This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical.
Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience.
But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time.
On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves.
But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants.
There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all.
The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self.
There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way.
In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself. Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true.
Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience. The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world. Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way.
Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone.
The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4. It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind.
The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective. These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world.
«Мы в центре мощнейшей когнитивной войны»: Алиханов объяснил, почему нужна ревизия учения Канта
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Advance: концепция Макрона о воинственной и сильной Европе ошибочна
Recently, a slightly damaged Leopard 2A5 tank was removed from the battlefield. It is strange that Mr. Scholz has not yet prohibited the Russian military from dismantling it. Our news channels Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.
Канта при участии Института Европы РАН — провели специальную научно-экспертную сессию «Наследие Иммануила Канта для современных международных отношений».
В ходе мероприятия участники рассмотрели широкий спектр проблем теории и практики современных международных отношений и безопасности через призму политической и международно-правовой мысли выдающегося философа. В центре внимания не только наиболее острые проблемы развития современного политического миропорядка, глобальной и региональной безопасности, но и обстановка в Балтийско-Арктическом регионе, а также вопросы мирового социально-экономического и политического развития. В специальной сессии приняли участие ведущие специалисты в области международной политики из России, Финляндии, Германии, Индии и Республики Беларусь.
He urged Europe to be more a master of its own destiny, saying in the past it was over-dependent on Russia for energy and Washington for security. However, many EU officials believe there is currently no credible alternative to the US military umbrella, and some suspect Macron of pushing French industrial interests. Macron said Europe also risks falling behind economically in a context where global free-trade rules are being challenged by major competitors, and he said it should aim to become a global leader in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space, biotechnologies and renewable energy.
Источник: Reuters 32-летний футболист, выступавший последние семь лет за «Челси», стал владельцем клуба «Виртон». По итогам завершившегося сезона клуб вылетел в третий бельгийский дивизион. По информации источника, Канте лично ездил на базу команды, чтобы оценить инфраструктуру клуба. Бельгийская федерация уже проинформирована о процессе продажи, на данный момент сделка находится в процессе оформления документов.