Впервые президент Франции Эммануэль Макрон принял участие в заседании комитета по поиску решений для легальной досрочной смерти. "Я глубоко убежден – и это отвечает. emmanuelle_kant. ·@emmakant·. Loving life. The governor of Kaliningrad, Anton Alikhanov, said Friday that Immanuel Kant is responsible for the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Смотрите 57 фотографии онлайн по теме кант мемы. French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday urged Europe to wake up to the fact that it was not sufficiently armed in the face of global threats such as Russian aggression that pose an existential.
Искусственный интеллект «оживил» Иммануила Канта в Калининграде
Слушайте Doing Nothing with Emmanuel Kant от ParisPiano на Deezer. Благодаря потоковой трансляции музыки на Deezer вы можете слушать более 120 млн треков. Immanuel Kant, German philosopher who was one of the foremost thinkers of the Enlightenment and who inaugurated a new era of philosophical thought. His comprehensive and systematic work in. Breaking Irish and International News.
‘Nothing would survive’ Scientists warn dark energy could ‘END universe at any moment’
Эммануэль Кант, 07.08.2001. Доступны для просмотра фотографии, лайки, образование. Experts at Emmanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (BFU) believe this would be caused by so-called “acceleration of dark matter”. It is based on three key theories about what impacts dark energy would. С анимированным портретом 44-летнего Канта кисти Иоганна Готлиба Беккера теперь старается пообщаться почти каждый экскурсант Кафедрального собора. Emmanuel Kant слушать лучшее онлайн бесплатно в хорошем качестве на Яндекс Музыке. The governor of Kaliningrad, Anton Alikhanov, said Friday that Immanuel Kant is responsible for the outbreak of war in Ukraine.
Doing Nothing with Emmanuel Kant
Но в чём-то они схожи: философа уже называют "Эммануилом". В бюллетенях голосования "Великие имена России", раздаваемых в самолётах, немецкого философа Иммануила Канта называют "Эммануилом". Об этом 21 ноября 2018 года сообщила в Facebook пассажир одного из самолётов. Выходит, организаторы присвоения имени аэропорту Храброво столкнулись с трудностями написания имени немецкого философа.
Smith explores two points of view on this issue. George H. Smith George H.
I do not believe that the great clock of the cathedral there did its daily work more dispassionately and regularly than to its compatriot Immanuel Kant. More serious and more fundamental is the method Peikoff used to link Kant to Nazism. Hayek have regarded themselves as Kantians. It may come as a surprise to many libertarians and Objectivists to learn that Rand and Peikoff were not the first to link Immanuel Kant to Nazism.
Remember last year when it seemed like the Oscars were racist? The group was escorted through the back doors of the Kodak Theater with no idea what was in store, as Kimmel had the house lights turned down.
When the tourists—Awww, ordinary slobs! Look, Meryl!
This is called exploitation, and using unconsenting human beings as a means to an end. Jimmy thinks its funny. Of course, any drama that Gibson directs pales in comparison to his own behind-the-scenes odyssey: the story of an odious individual who, after years on the outskirts of Hollywood, has somehow managed to fight his way back into the mainstream. Have some damn respect for those who did risked their lives incredible things so hacks like you can write garbage like that and be paid for it, you stupid, stupid fool.
«Мы в центре мощнейшей когнитивной войны»: Алиханов объяснил, почему нужна ревизия учения Канта
Bowman on Kant anti-Semitism. We will see it from an example of the thought of Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) on education. Let us start by recalling some of these digital issues that current events force us to consider. Иммануил Кант родился в Кенигсберге в 1724 году, прожил в городе всю жизнь, не покидая его пределов, и был похоронен у северной стены Собора в профессорском склепе. В рамках международного Кантовского конгресса в Калининграде инициаторы развития «Балтийской платформы» – ИМЭМО РАН, МГИМО МИД России, БФУ имени И. Канта при. не столько повествование о «последних днях» немецкого философа, сколько собрание любопытных фактов, легенд и баек об Иммануил Кант родился 22 апреля 1724 года в Кенигсберге, Пруссия, в небогатой семье ремесленника.
Doing Nothing with Emmanuel Kant
Whereas the former was concerned with the contributions of the sensibility, the latter is concerned, first, with the contributions of the understanding "Transcendental Analytic" and, second, with the faculty of reason as the source of both metaphysical errors and genuine regulatory principles "Transcendental Dialectic". The "Transcendental Analytic" is further divided into two sections. The first, "Analytic of Concepts", is concerned with establishing the universality and necessity of the pure concepts of the understanding i. The second, "Analytic of Principles", is concerned with the application of those pure concepts in empirical judgments. This second section is longer than the first and is further divided into many sub-sections. These twelve basic categories define what it is to be a thing in general—that is, they articulate the necessary conditions according to which something is a possible object of experience. These, in conjunction with the a priori forms of intuition, are the basis of all synthetic a priori cognition. The first, known as the "metaphysical deduction", proceeds analytically from a table of the Aristotelian logical functions of judgment. As Kant was aware, this assumes precisely what the skeptic rejects, namely, the existence of synthetic a priori cognition. For this reason, Kant also supplies a synthetic argument that does not depend upon the assumption in dispute.
Kant himself said that it is the one that cost him the most labor. The task of the "Analytic of Principles" is to show both that they must universally apply to objects given in actual experience i. The second book continues this line of argument in four chapters, each associated with one of the category groupings. In some cases, it adds a connection to the spatial dimension of intuition to the categories it analyzes. Some commentators consider this the most significant section of the Critique. He argues that the unity of time implies that "all change must consist in the alteration of states in an underlying substance, whose existence and quantity must be unchangeable or conserved. That was the end of the chapter in the A edition of the Critique. The B edition includes one more short section, "The Refutation of Idealism". In this section, by analysis of the concept of self-consciousness, Kant argues that his transcendental idealism is a "critical" or "formal" idealism that does not deny the existence of reality apart from our subjective representations.
Against this, Kant reasserts his own insistence upon the necessity of a sensible component in all genuine knowledge. In particular, it is concerned to demonstrate as spurious the efforts of reason to arrive at knowledge independent of sensibility. This endeavor, Kant argues, is doomed to failure, which he claims to demonstrate by showing that reason, unbounded by sense, is always capable of generating opposing or otherwise incompatible conclusions. Like "the light dove, in free flight cutting through the air, the resistance of which it feels", reason "could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space". He presents the speculative excesses of traditional metaphysics as inherent in our very capacity of reason. Moreover, he argues that its products are not without some carefully qualified regulative value. They are different from the concepts of understanding in that they are not limited by the critical stricture limiting knowledge to the conditions of possible experience and its objects. Kant replaces the first with the positive results of the first part of the Critique. He proposes to replace the following three with his later doctrines of anthropology, the metaphysical foundations of natural science, and the critical postulation of human freedom and morality.
He does this by developing contradictions in each of the three metaphysical disciplines that he contends are in fact pseudosciences. In this context, it not possible to do much more than enumerate the topics of discussion. The first chapter addresses what Kant terms the paralogisms—i. He argues that one cannot take the mere thought of "I" in the proposition "I think" as the proper cognition of "I" as an object.
Look, Meryl! The little people! This is called exploitation, and using unconsenting human beings as a means to an end. Jimmy thinks its funny.
The philosopher, famous for his work on ethics, aesthetics and philosophical ontology, is rightly considered one of the pillars of German classical philosophy. Though he is as undeniably German as the Nord Stream pipeline, Putin and anyone else anywhere has a right to quote him morning, noon and night. Though Kant is as German as Tolstoy, who regarded himself as a philosopher and not a writer, is Russian, their brilliance belongs to the world. Scholz, in other words, is free to quote Tolstoy, once, of course, he first learns to read. Putin, as it happens, spent much of his working life in Germany and he speaks the language of Kant, Schiller and Goethe at least as fluently as Scholz which is, admittedly, a low bar. Not only that but Putin has been praising and quoting Kant for decades and has even gone so far as saying that the philosopher should be made an official symbol of Kaliningrad Region. Catherine the Great , who was actually born in Prussia, and the German speaking and Kant admiring Putin have carried on those links into more modern times.
His judgment is imperative and categorical. Depending on the mood, the affirmation, a priori and without concept, can make a philosopher smile or choke up. To discover Follow information on the war in Ukraine with the Figaro application But a geographer will see it as a sign of an old grudge.
Emmanuel Kant Duarte's Projects
- Scholz “forbade” Putin from quoting Immanuel Kant
- Новая экспозиция, первая книга, премьера лекции и стендап
- Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте
- Кант Иммануил
- Читайте также
- Голосование "Великие имена": в самолётах Канта уже называют "Эммануилом"
Search code, repositories, users, issues, pull requests...
Канте выступал за «Челси» с 2016 года. Полузащитник провел за лондонцев 269 матчей, в которых забил 13 голов и отдал 16 результативных передач. Читайте также.
Концепция Канта тесно связана с его же философией, поэтому анализ учения о праве, морали и государстве в целом представляется долгим, порой даже муторным и сложным в силу того, что его философские труды не читала, просто наслышана о некоторых максимах Канта.
George H. Smith George H. I do not believe that the great clock of the cathedral there did its daily work more dispassionately and regularly than to its compatriot Immanuel Kant. More serious and more fundamental is the method Peikoff used to link Kant to Nazism.
Hayek have regarded themselves as Kantians. It may come as a surprise to many libertarians and Objectivists to learn that Rand and Peikoff were not the first to link Immanuel Kant to Nazism. In this book of nearly 700 pages, McGovern wrote: In each and every case the spread of idealist doctrines in the spheres of philosophy, or history, or law, or general literature coincided with the belief in either etatism [i.
Первые часы после пробуждения он посвящал собственным работам, далее отправлялся в университет читать лекции. Затем следовал единственный прием пищи за сутки — плотный обед в час дня. Обедал Кант всегда в компании друзей, среди которых были представители кенигсбергской знати и купечества. Чтобы беседа за столом была оживленной и интересной, философ даже придумал собственное правило: число гостей должно быть больше количества граций, но не превышать количество муз. А еще на обедах его доме говорили о чем угодно, но не о философии. Во второй половине дня Кант в одиночестве совершал продолжительную прогулку, строго следуя по одному и тому же маршруту. Некая эксцентричность привычек не мешала философу вести светский образ жизни — у него было много знакомств и приятелей, а сам он был галантен с дамами. Читал лекции по теоретической физике и тригонометрии Когда в марте 1746 года умер отец Иммануила Канта Георг, тому пришлось на время взять на себя домашние хлопоты, в том числе заботу о двух младших сестрах 17 и 14 лет и 9-летнем брате. В 1748-м Кант покинул Кенигсберг, стал давать частные уроки и на время забыл об университетской жизни. Вернулся обратно он только спустя шесть лет, в 1754 году, и с тех пор его жизнь была связана с университетом и преподаванием. В апреле 1755-го Иммануил Кант получил степень магистра, а в июне, защитив латинскую диссертацию «Новое освещение первых принципов метафизического познания», — докторскую степень и звание приват-доцента философии. Но была одна тонкость: он не получал от университета деньги, только гонорары от студентов за посещение лекций. Поэтому Кант начал активно и много преподавать. Так, у него появился курс лекций по физической географии, общему естествознанию, этике, механике, физике и тригонометрии.
DEV Community
- Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant
- Канте прошёл вторую часть медобследования перед переходом в «Аль-Иттихад»
- Daily Mail: Канте хочет перейти в «Интер»
- Записи по теме
- Канте прошёл вторую часть медобследования перед переходом в «Аль-Иттихад» — РТ на русском
- 33 emmanuel kant stock photos, vectors, and illustrations are available royalty-free for download.
Главное правило жизни, которому учит философия Канта
В рамках международного Кантовского конгресса в Калининграде инициаторы развития «Балтийской платформы» – ИМЭМО РАН, МГИМО МИД России, БФУ имени И. Канта при. Лоран Канте родился в 1961 году в семье школьных учителей, киноискусство он изучал сначала в Марселе, а потом — в парижской Высшей школе кинематографистов. Иммануил Кант – немецкий философ, основал немецкую классическую философию, жил в эпоху Просвещения и романтизма.
« Le wokisme aboutit à des idées réactionnaires »
- Популярное за месяц
- ParisPiano - Doing Nothing with Emmanuel Kant: тексты и песни | Deezer
- Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте
- Widget Archives
Последние дни Иммануила Канта (1996)
The most obvious form of synthetic proposition is a simple empirical observation. This is because, unlike a posteriori cognition, a priori cognition has "true or strict... It is the twofold aim of the Critique both to prove and to explain the possibility of this knowledge. In general terms, the former is a non-discursive representation of a particular object, and the latter is a discursive or mediate representation of a general type of object. Knowledge generated on this basis, under certain conditions, can be synthetic a priori.
In this "transcendental dialectic", Kant argues that many of the claims of traditional rationalist metaphysics violate the criteria he claims to establish in the first, "constructive" part of his book. Something is "transcendental" if it is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, and "idealism" denotes some form of mind-dependence that must be further specified. It argues that all genuine knowledge requires a sensory component, and thus that metaphysical claims that transcend the possibility of sensory confirmation can never amount to knowledge. On this particular view, the thing-in-itself is not numerically identical the phenomenal empirical object.
Kant also spoke of the thing in itself or transcendent object as a product of the human understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, some interpreters argue that the thing in itself does not represent a separate ontological domain but simply a way of considering objects by means of the understanding alone; this is known as the "two-aspect" view. Whereas the former was concerned with the contributions of the sensibility, the latter is concerned, first, with the contributions of the understanding "Transcendental Analytic" and, second, with the faculty of reason as the source of both metaphysical errors and genuine regulatory principles "Transcendental Dialectic". The "Transcendental Analytic" is further divided into two sections.
The first, "Analytic of Concepts", is concerned with establishing the universality and necessity of the pure concepts of the understanding i. The second, "Analytic of Principles", is concerned with the application of those pure concepts in empirical judgments. This second section is longer than the first and is further divided into many sub-sections. These twelve basic categories define what it is to be a thing in general—that is, they articulate the necessary conditions according to which something is a possible object of experience.
These, in conjunction with the a priori forms of intuition, are the basis of all synthetic a priori cognition. The first, known as the "metaphysical deduction", proceeds analytically from a table of the Aristotelian logical functions of judgment. As Kant was aware, this assumes precisely what the skeptic rejects, namely, the existence of synthetic a priori cognition. For this reason, Kant also supplies a synthetic argument that does not depend upon the assumption in dispute.
Kant himself said that it is the one that cost him the most labor. The task of the "Analytic of Principles" is to show both that they must universally apply to objects given in actual experience i. The second book continues this line of argument in four chapters, each associated with one of the category groupings. In some cases, it adds a connection to the spatial dimension of intuition to the categories it analyzes.
Some commentators consider this the most significant section of the Critique. He argues that the unity of time implies that "all change must consist in the alteration of states in an underlying substance, whose existence and quantity must be unchangeable or conserved. That was the end of the chapter in the A edition of the Critique. The B edition includes one more short section, "The Refutation of Idealism".
In this section, by analysis of the concept of self-consciousness, Kant argues that his transcendental idealism is a "critical" or "formal" idealism that does not deny the existence of reality apart from our subjective representations. Against this, Kant reasserts his own insistence upon the necessity of a sensible component in all genuine knowledge. In particular, it is concerned to demonstrate as spurious the efforts of reason to arrive at knowledge independent of sensibility.
The little people! This is called exploitation, and using unconsenting human beings as a means to an end.
Jimmy thinks its funny. Of course, any drama that Gibson directs pales in comparison to his own behind-the-scenes odyssey: the story of an odious individual who, after years on the outskirts of Hollywood, has somehow managed to fight his way back into the mainstream.
Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located. We cannot know theoretically that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves. In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us.
We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition. Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps.
It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did. Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves. Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal.
In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience.
But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism.
One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants.
There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content.
In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way.
In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself. Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience. The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world. Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument.
In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way. Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone.
The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4. It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind. The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective. These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world.
The first major hypothesis is the energy is evenly distributed across the universe. A second theory defines dark energy as varying in density over time and space.
BFU professor Artyom Yurok said depending on which theory was true, it could lead to the end of the universe.